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We introduce a robust scheme for long-distance continuous-variable (CV) measurement-device-independent
(MDI) quantum key distribution in which we employ postselection between distant parties communicating
through the medium of an untrusted relay. We perform a security analysis that allows for general transmissivity
and thermal noise variance of each link, in which we assume that an eavesdropper performs a collective attack
and controls the excess thermal noise in the channels. The introduction of postselection enables the parties to
sustain a secret key rate over distances exceeding those of existing CV MDI protocols. In the worst-case scenario
in which the relay is positioned equidistant between them, we find that the parties may communicate securely
over a range of 14 km in standard optical fiber. Our protocol helps to overcome the rate-distance limitations of
previously proposed CV MDI protocols while maintaining many of their advantages.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevResearch.2.033424
I. INTRODUCTION
With the promise of provably secure communication built
on the laws of physics, quantum key distribution (QKD) [1,2]
is one of the most important results emerging from the field of
quantum information theory [3,4]. Quantum key distribution
allows two parties, conventionally named Alice and Bob, to
generate a secret key by communicating via an untrusted
quantum channel. An eavesdropper (Eve) may employ the
most robust attack allowed by the laws of physics, however,
she is always restricted by the inherent uncertainty of quan-
tum mechanics and is forced to avoid overtampering with
the signal as doing so will reveal her presence to the parties.
By combining the attained secret key from a QKD protocol
with the one-time pad algorithm, fully secure communication
between the parties is guaranteed.
In recent years the field of QKD has evolved rapidly from
the primitive BB84 protocol [5] to current state-of-the-art
provably secure protocols allowing parties to communicate
over hundreds of kilometers [6–8]. Furthermore, there exists a
large body of work based on proof-of-principle experiments
and in-field tests, including ground-to-satellite communica-
tions [9–11]. Most of the aforementioned work has focused on
discrete-variable (DV) protocols. Continuous-variable (CV)
protocols are promising alternatives that make use of readily
available, inexpensive, and easily implementable equipment.
CV protocols have been demonstrated to be capable of secret
key rates close to the PLOB bound, which is the limit of
repeaterless quantum communications in a lossy channel [12].
Published by the American Physical Society under the terms of the
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Many protocols have been proven secure and others have been
demonstrated in a proof-of-concept experiment [13] and field
tests [14,15]. Recently, experimental results for long-distance
CV QKD over 202.81 km of ultralow-loss optical fiber have
been achieved [16].
Many recent QKD protocols have focused on an end-to-
end as opposed to point-to-point approach in which Alice
and Bob communicate via remote relays. Introducing a single
relay allows the parties to perform measurement-device-
independent (MDI) QKD protocols, even if the relay is
untrusted [17–22]. Measurement device independence re-
moves the security threat of side-channel attacks attempted
by Eve. Several MDI-inspired protocols have been devised
that can achieve high rates and exceed the PLOB bound. The
first of these protocols was the seminal twin-field protocol
[23–25], followed by the phase-matching protocol [26,27] and
the sending-or-not-sending protocol [28–31]. See Fig. 11 of
Ref. [1] for a summary of their performances.
A CV MDI protocol was proposed and demonstrated
in a proof-of-concept experiment to achieve very high se-
cret key rates over relatively short distances [32] (see also
Refs. [33–35] for other studies). Unfortunately, developing
a protocol that allows exploitation of the practicality of the
CV MDI regime at long distance is a difficult problem in
recent QKD theory [36–39]. A great deal of effort has been
directed at improving the performance of this type of pro-
tocol, with proposals based on virtual photon subtraction
[40,41], unidimensional modulation [42], or discrete modu-
lation [43]. While these protocols offered an improvement
in the range of the asymmetric configuration, in which the
relay is positioned within close range of one of the par-
ties, their applicability in the symmetric configuration, in
which the relay is positioned equidistance between the parties,
was very limited. Only Refs. [40,41] offered any improve-
ment over the original CV MDI protocol in the symmetric
configuration.
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In this work, we begin to bridge the rate-distance gap
between DV and CV MDI protocols. In particular, we aim
to improve the distance over which a rate is attainable in
the symmetric configuration. In this case, a secret key rate
under the original CV MDI protocol and ideal conditions
is only attainable at very short distances corresponding to a
0.75-dB loss [33]. In order to extend this range, we employ a
postselection regime. Postselection describes the ability of the
parties to select only instances of the protocol in which they
have an advantage over the eavesdropper, given a prescriptive
map of the contribution of the possible signals. By discarding
any other instances, the secret key rate is always positive, and
the parties can communicate securely up to a distance at which
the key rate drops below a minimum usability threshold.
Postselection of a CV protocol was first introduced by
Silberhorn et al. [44] where it allowed a secret key to be con-
structed for losses exceeding the previous limit of 3 dB. Later,
the technique was generalized to thermal loss channels [45,46]
and the concept has been demonstrated in experimental set-
tings [47,48]. In this work, we consider the postselection of an
MDI protocol which includes a measurement at an untrusted
relay. We perform postselection over the relay measurement
outcome as well as Alice’s and Bob’s variables while assum-
ing that Eve employs a collective attack in which she targets
both the Alice-relay and Bob-relay links.
The paper is structured as follows. We begin by outlining
the protocol in detail and follow the evolution of the modes.
We then derive the mutual information between the parties
and the Holevo bound in order to quantify Eve’s information.
Using these quantities, we can build the single-point rate,
which serves as a prescriptive map for the parties to select
the advantageous channel uses. Finally, we calculate the post-
selected secret key rate of the protocol.
II. PROTOCOL
Let us begin our analysis by outlining our protocol which is
shown schematically in Fig. 1. The secure parties that we label
Alice and Bob are each connected to a relay with fiber optic
links. We assume that both parties have access to a general
Gaussian distribution of the form
p(x, σ ) = 1√
2πσ
exp
(
− x
2
2σ
)
. (1)
In each use of the protocol, Alice draws two random numbers
qA and pA from her Gaussian distribution with variance σA.
From these two numbers, she extracts absolute values |qA| =
A and |pA| = A′ and signs κ and κ ′, respectively. For both
κ and κ ′, she records bit values 0 (1) if the sign is positive
(negative). She proceeds to prepare a coherent state of the
form | 12 (κ A+iκ ′ A′)〉 and sends it to the relay via a quantum
channel. Bob follows a similar procedure, generating two
random numbers qB and pB using his Gaussian distribution
with a generally different variance σB. He generates a state of
the form | 12 (κ˜ B+i κ˜ ′ B′)〉 and sends it to the relay.
After quantum communication ceases, the parties perform
basis reconciliation. If the q quadrature is chosen, the vari-
ables κ ′ and κ˜ ′ are ignored. Alice publicly broadcasts A and
pA while Bob broadcasts B and pB and attempts to reconcile
his variable κ˜ with Alice’s variable κ . Alternatively, if the p
FIG. 1. Schematic of the protocol assuming the q quadrature is
chosen by the parties for reconciliation. (a) Alice and Bob send their
coherent states to the relay. Eve is in possession of two two-mode
squeezed vacuum states, denoted by white circles. She employs dual
entangling cloner attacks, interacting with Alice’s and Bob’s mode
beam splitters of transmissivity τA and τB, respectively. The output
modes A′ and B′ are mixed in the balanced beam splitter at the relay
and the new output modes A′′ and B′′ are subsequently measured with
homodyne p and q detection with corresponding outcomes γp and
γq, respectively, that are publicly announced. After quantum com-
munication ceases, Alice broadcasts A and pA while Bob broadcasts
B and pB. (b) In the restricted eavesdropping scenario Bob’s action
is modeled in the entanglement-based representation. He measures,
with heterodyne detection, one mode b of a two-mode squeezed vac-
uum state of variance μ obtaining the outcome (κ˜ B, pB ). This action
prepares coherent states in the conjugate mode B that is subsequently
sent to the relay.
quadrature is chosen, the relevant variables become κ ′ and κ˜ ′.
Alice broadcasts A′ and qA while Bob broadcasts B′ and qB.
We assume that Eve employs dual entangling cloner at-
tacks in which she inserts beam splitters of transmissivity
τA and τB into lossless Alice-relay and Bob-relay channels,
respectively. She uses the beam splitters to mix Alice’s mode
A with her mode E1 and Bob’s mode B with her mode E2.
The modes E1 and E2 each form one half of independent
two-mode squeezed vacuum (TMSV) states with conjugate
modes e1 and e2 and variances ωA and ωB, respectively. She
stores the outputs from one port of each beam splitter in a
quantum memory and sends the remaining outputs A′ and B′
to the relay, where they are mixed in a balanced beam splitter
with outputs A′′ and B′′ that are subsequently measured with
homodyne detection in the p and q quadratures, respectively.
The corresponding outcomes γp and γq are publicly broadcast
as γ = (γq, γp).
To model detector inefficiencies, we can treat the modes A′′
and B′′ as passing through beam splitters of transmissivity η
where they are each mixed with one half of separate TMSV
states with identical variance S before arriving at 100% ef-
ficient homodyne detectors. We may assume that the noise of
the detectors is untrusted, in which case we assume the TMSV
states are part of Eve’s state and are included in the calculation
of Eve’s information, or trusted, in which case they are dis-
carded. If S = 1 and τA = τB = τ , the detector inefficiencies
can be modeled without considering beam-splitter interactions
at the relay by absorbing the detector efficiency parameter into
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FIG. 2. Models of inefficiency in homodyne detection at the relay using beam splitters. (a) Trusted noise scenario in which it is assumed
that Eve does not have access to the output of the beam splitters. (b) Outputs of the beam splitters are assumed to be added to Eve’s quantum
memory for later measurement. (c) Simplification in the symmetric case (τA = τB = τ ) and with S = 1 in which the transmissivities of the
Alice-relay and Bob-relay links are scaled by a factor of η to model the effect of beam splitters at detectors.
the transmissivities of the links such that τ → ητ . We outline
each model schematically in Fig. 2.
In this paper, our goal is to establish the postselected
asymptotic key rate of the protocol RPS. However, our initial
objective is to obtain a formula for the standard asymptotic
secret key rate R, which is given by the difference in the
reconcilable information between the trusted parties βIAB,
where β is the reconciliation efficiency and IAB is the mutual
information between the parties, and the Holevo bound χ ,
which quantifies the maximum information Eve may attain
about the secret variable depending on the particular attack,
R = βIAB − χ. (2)
To this end, we follow the propagation of the covariance ma-
trix (CM) of the total Alice-Bob-Eve system and its associated
mean value. As each use of the protocol is Gaussian, these are
the only tools we need to compute the probabilities and states
needed to derive the key rate. After this step is complete, we
explain the postselection procedure which allows us to extend
the range of the protocol.
The initial covariance matrix of the total system is given by
VABE |κ κ˜ κ ′ κ˜ ′ A B A′ B′ = IA ⊕ IB ⊕ VE, (3)
where VE is Eve’s initial CM, which, assuming she controls
the detector noise at the relay, is given by
VE = VTMSV(ωA) ⊕ VTMSV(ωB)
⊕ VTMSV(S) ⊕ VTMSV(S), (4)
with VTMSV(μ) the CM of a TMSV state with variance μ
given by
VTMSV(μ) =
(
μI
√
μ2 − 1Z√
μ2 − 1Z μI
)
, (5)
where Z = diag(1,−1) and I is the 2 × 2 identity matrix. The
mean value of the combined system of Alice and Bob is given
by
x¯AB|κ κ˜ κ ′ κ˜ ′ A B A′ B′ = (κ A, κ ′ A′, κ˜ B, κ˜ ′ B′)T, (6)
while the mean value of Eve’s system can be taken initially
as zero. The action of all of the beam splitters can be en-
capsulated by a unitary operator ˆT that, when applied to the
system, gives the postpropagation CM VA′′B′′E′|κ κ˜ κ ′ κ˜ ′ A B A′ B′
and mean value x¯A′′B′′E′|κ κ˜ κ ′ κ˜ ′ A B A′ B′ . Eve’s CM with con-
ditioning on γ is obtained by performing the homodyne
measurements at the relay on the modes A′′ and B′′ in the p
and q quadratures, respectively. The measurement outcome
in the q quadrature γq with conditioning on the measurement
outcome of the p quadrature γp is given by
p(γq|κ κ˜ κ ′ κ˜ ′ A B A′ B′ γp)
= 1√
2πυ
exp
[
− 1
2υ
(
γ +
√
η
2
(κ A√τA − κ˜ B√τB)
)2]
(7)
and in the reverse case we have
p(γp|κ κ˜ κ ′ κ˜ ′ A B A′ B′ γq)
= 1√
2πυ
exp
[
− 1
2υ
(
γ−
√
η
2
(κ ′ A′√τA+ κ˜ ′ B′√τB)
)2]
,
(8)
where
υ = (1 − η)S + η
2
[τA + τB + (1 − τA)ωA + (1 − τB)ωB].
(9)
Noting that the two quadratures are independent, we have
p(γq|κ κ˜ κ ′ κ˜ ′ A B A′ B′ γp) = p(γq|κ κ˜ A B), (10)
p(γp|κ κ˜ κ ′ κ˜ ′ A B A′ B′ γq) = p(γp|κ ′ κ˜ ′ A′ B′). (11)
This fact allows us to simplify our calculation of the rate
by only considering one quadrature. The quadrature of im-
portance is that which is chosen by Alice and Bob in the
quadrature reconciliation step as it, at this point, becomes
the quadrature that contains the relevant encoding variable.
However, the rate is independent of this choice of quadrature.
We will therefore arbitrarily choose the q quadrature for our
forthcoming calculation of the rate and we will employ the
refined notation γ ≡ γq while ignoring the variables κ ′, κ˜ ′,
A
′
, and B′.
Restricted eavesdropping
If Bob broadcasts the tuple (B, pB) or (qB,B′), he ensures
that both parties can independently establish which instances
of the protocol should be included in the final key. Such a
communication step is likely a necessity in any postselection
protocol; however, there may be a more optimal strategy that
reduces the amount of information Bob must broadcast and
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therefore the amount of information Eve gains. As an exam-
ple, it may be possible for Bob to reveal the string of good
instances at the end of the protocol as opposed to broadcasting
his measurement data in each use. A strategy such as this
would yield a secret key rate that lies in between the achiev-
able lower bound in which Bob broadcasts the aforementioned
tuples in every use of the protocol and the upper bound in
which no information is broadcast by Bob. An alternative
way to think about the latter is to consider a restricted eaves-
dropping scenario in which Eve does not make use of the
information broadcast by Bob in her attack. In this context,
it is possible to compute the upper bound on the secret key
rate by computing Eve’s states without conditioning on Bob’s
measurement outcome. To establish Eve’s states in this case,
we need to consider an entanglement-based version of the
protocol as shown in Fig. 1(b). Bob’s action may be modeled
as measuring one mode of a TMSV state with variance μ.
The amplitude of the coherent states | ˜β〉 remotely prepared as
a result of this process is related to the measurement outcome
β by
˜β = ξβ∗, ξ =
√
μ+ 1
μ− 1 . (12)
We label Bob’s heterodyne measurement outcome
(κ˜ B, κ˜ ′ B′).
For our analysis, we again consider only the q quadrature
using the fact that the quadratures are uncorrelated. After
applying the beam-splitter operation to the CM and mean
value, we obtain the relay measurement outcome γ ≡ γq with
probability
p(γ |κ A) = 1√
2πυ˜
exp
[
− 1
2υ˜
(
γ + κ A
√
1
2
ητA
)2]
, (13)
where
υ˜ = (1 − η)S + η
2
[τA + τBμ+ (1 − τA)ωA + (1 − τB)ωB].
(14)
After the relay measurements, the CM and mean value of the
remaining system become VbE′|κ A γ and x¯bE′|κ A γ . Eve’s CM
and mean value are obtained by tracing out Bob’s remaining
mode b. In the final step, Bob performs a heterodyne measure-
ment on his retained mode. With the associated probability
distribution p(κ˜ B, pB|κ A γ ) and by integrating over pB we
obtain
p(κ˜ B |κ A γ ) = 1√
2πVb
× exp
⎡
⎢⎣− 12Vb
⎛
⎜⎝κ˜ B−
√
(μ2 − 1)ητB
2
(
γ +κ A
√
1
2ητA
)
υ
⎞
⎟⎠
2⎤
⎥⎦,
(15)
where
Vb = (μ+ 1)
(
1 − μ− 1
υ
ητB
2
)
. (16)
In the following sections, we derive the secret key rate of the
protocol for both eavesdropping scenarios based on the secret
encoding variable κ and Bob’s variable κ˜ . We first compute
the mutual information and then the Holevo bound and finally
we introduce the postselection procedure and calculate the
postselected rate.
III. MUTUAL INFORMATION
The first step in the calculations of the secret key rate is
to establish the mutual information between Alice and Bob
using the protocol outputs. The mutual information formula is
given, independently of the eavesdropping strategy, by
I (κ : κ˜ |A B γ ) = H (κ|A B γ ) − H (κ| κ˜ A B γ ), (17)
where, for random variables X and Y , H (X |Y ) =∫
p(y)HX |ydy is the conditional entropy of X given Y
and HX |y is the entropy of X conditioned on Y taking the
value y. The first term of the mutual information is therefore
given by
H (κ|A B γ ) =
∫
p(A B γ )Hκ|A B γ d A d B d γ , (18)
while the second may be expressed as
H (κ| κ˜ A B γ )
=
∫
p(A B γ )
∑
κ˜
p(κ˜ |A B γ )Hκ| κ˜ A B γ d A d B d γ , (19)
where Hκ|A B γ and Hκ| κ˜ A B γ reduce to the binary entropy
of respective probabilities p(κ|A B γ ) and p(κ| κ˜ A B γ ). We
can derive the latter probability using Bayes’s theorem as
p(κ| κ˜ A B γ )
= p(γ |κ κ˜ A B)p(κ| κ˜ A B)∑
κ p(γ |κ κ˜ A B)p(κ| κ˜ A B)
= 1
1 + exp [2κ A√ 12ητA(γ − κ˜ B
√
1
2ητB
)
υ−1
] , (20)
where we have used the fact that κ , κ˜ , A, and B are indepen-
dent variables. Using the same logic, we derive
p(κ˜ |κ A B γ )
= 1
1 + exp [−2 κ˜ B√ 12ητB(γ + κ A
√
1
2ητA
)
υ−1
] . (21)
We also require the probabilities of each of κ and κ˜ with
conditioning on A, B, and γ only. We have
p(κ|A B γ )
=
∑
κ˜ p(γ |κ κ˜ A B)p(κ κ˜ |A B)∑
κ,κ˜ p(γ |κ κ˜ A B)p(κ κ˜ |A B)
= 1
1 + ( p(+|1 A B γ )p(−|0 A B γ ))κ exp [2κ
√
1
2η(B
√
τB +A√τA)υ−1
] ,
(22)
where we note that p(κ κ˜ |A B) = 1/4 for all combinations of
κ and κ˜ due to the independence of the variables. Using the
same logic, we obtain the remaining probability required for
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the calculation of the conditional entropies,
p(κ˜ |A B γ )
= 1
1 + ( p(0|−A B γ )p(1|+A B γ ) )κ˜ exp [−2 κ˜
√
1
2η(B
√
τB +A√τA)υ−1
] .
(23)
The final probability we require is the total probability of all
of the postselection variables, which is given by
p(A B γ ) =
∑
κ,κ˜
p(γ |κ κ˜ A B)p(κ A)p(κ˜ B). (24)
The probabilities for the computation of the mutual infor-
mation in the restricted eavesdropping scenario are slightly
more complicated due to Bob’s TMSV state; however, the first
conditional probability is easily attainable as
p(κ˜ |κ A B γ )
= p(κ˜ B |κ A γ )∑
p(κ˜ B |κ A γ )
= 1
1 + exp [−2 κ˜ B (γ +κ A√ 12ητA) υ˜ ′−1]
, (25)
where we have defined
υ˜ ′ = (1 − η)S + η
2
[τA + τB + ωA(1 − τA) + ωB(1 − τB)]
(26)
and
 =
√
η
2
1
τB
√
μ− 1
μ+ 1 . (27)
In order to calculate the reverse probability p(κ| κ˜ A B γ ), we
first compute
p(κ|A γ ) = p(γ |κ A)∑
κ p(γ |κ A)
= 1
1 + exp (2κ A γ√ 12ητAυ˜−1)
(28)
and then the required probability can be derived as
p(κ| κ˜ A B γ )
= p(κ˜ B |κ A γ )p(κ|A γ )∑
κ p(κ˜ B |κ A γ )p(κ|A γ )
= 1
1 + exp [2κ A√ 12ητA(γ ′ − κ˜ B)υ˜ ′−1]
, (29)
where we have defined
γ ′ = 1
υ˜
(
υ˜ ′ + η
2
1
τB
(μ− 1)
)
γ . (30)
We can now compute the total probabilities of κ and κ˜ as
p(κ|A B γ ) =
∑
κ˜ p(κ˜ B |κ A γ )p(κ|A γ )∑
κ,κ˜ p(κ˜ B |κ A γ )p(κ|A γ )
= 1
1 +κ exp
[
2κ A
√
1
2ητA(γ ′ + B)υ˜ ′−1
]
(31)
and
p(κ˜ |A B γ ) = 1
1 +κ˜ exp
[−2 κ˜ B(γ −A√ 12ητA)υ˜ ′−1]
,
(32)
with
m =
(
p(1| +A B γ )
p(1| −A B γ )
)m
. (33)
Finally, the total probability of the three postselection vari-
ables becomes
p(A B γ ) =
∑
κ,κ˜
p(κ˜ B |κ A γ )p(γ |κ A)p(κ A). (34)
IV. HOLEVO BOUND
In our consideration of Eve’s accessible information on the
secret variable, we use the Holevo bound, which quantifies
the maximum amount of information Eve may attain using
any strategy permitted by the laws of quantum mechanics. We
may write the bound as
χ (E′ : κ|A B γ ) = S(E′|A B γ ) − S(E′|κ A B γ ), (35)
where S(X |x) := ∫ p(x)S(ρˆX |x )dx is the conditional von Neu-
mann entropy (VNE) of system X on variable x with
corresponding probability distribution p(x), and S(ρˆ ) is the
VNE of state ρˆ, defined as
S(ρˆ ) = −
∑
i
λi log2 λi, (36)
where {λi} are the eigenvalues of ρˆ.
The first term of the Holevo bound can be written as
S(E′|A B γ ) =
∫
p(A B γ )S(ρˆE′|A B γ )d A d B d γ , (37)
where ρˆE′|A B γ is Eve’s total state, which can be derived from
the output state of the protocol as
ρˆE′|A B γ =
∑
κ,κ˜
p(κ κ˜ |A B γ )ρˆE′|κ A κ˜ B γ . (38)
Similarly, the second (conditional) term is given by
S(E′|κ A B γ )
=
∫
p(A B γ )
∑
κ
p(κ|A B γ )S(ρˆE′|κ A B γ )d A d B d γ ,
(39)
where ρˆE′|κ A B γ is Eve’s conditional state given by
ρˆE′|κ A B γ =
∑
κ˜
p(κ˜ |κ A B γ )ρˆE′|κ κ˜ A B γ . (40)
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Neither the total nor the condition states are Gaussian, and
computing their entropy directly in the Fock basis is a diffi-
cult problem. Instead, we follow a method originating from
Refs. [45,46] for one-way protocols with coherent states, and
with little added complexity we derive the equivalent method
for the MDI protocol with coherent states.
Let us first note that Eve’s state emerging from the protocol
is pure and can be written in the shorthand notation
ρˆE′|κ κ˜ A B γ = ˆE′A B γκ κ˜ =
∣∣E′A B γκ κ˜ 〉〈E′A B γκ κ˜ ∣∣. (41)
For convenience we also introduce the shorthand notation
pA B γκ κ˜ ≡ p(κ κ˜ |A B γ ), (42)
pA B γκ˜ |κ ≡ p(κ˜ |κ A B γ ). (43)
Using the broadcast values A, pA, B, pB, and γ , Eve knows
that her total state is a convex combination of the four states
|E′A B γ0+ 〉, |E′A B γ0− 〉, |E′A B γ1+ 〉, and |E′A B γ1− 〉 and her state can
be expressed in a four-dimensional space. Note that in our
notation we use Alice’s assigned bit values 0 (1) to represent
κ = + (−) in order to aide distinguishability between κ and
κ˜ .
Let us rewrite the total state in Eq. (38) as
ρˆE′|A B γ =
∑
κ,κ˜
pA B γκ κ˜
∣∣E′A B γκ κ˜ 〉〈E′A B γκ κ˜ ∣∣. (44)
To examine the information held by Eve in her state we can
compute the matrix of all overlaps S whose elements Si j
are given by the overlaps 〈E′A B γκ1 κ˜1 |E
′A B γ
κ2 κ˜2
〉 of Eve’s possible
states. We may write the matrix of all overlaps as
0+ 0− 1+ 1−
S=
⎛
⎜⎝
1 B A AB
B 1 AB A
A AB 1 B
AB A B 1
⎞
⎟⎠
0+
0−
1+
1−
, (45)
where we have ignored phase factors that may always be re-
moved by multiplying the states |E′A B γκ κ˜ 〉 by other appropriate
phase factors. The matrix of overlaps reveals the interrelation-
ship between the basis vectors in Eve’s total state. It can be
seen that the matrix is expressible in tensor-product form as
S =
(
1 A
A 1
)
⊗
(
1 B
B 1
)
, (46)
which implies that Eve’s state is the product of two states in
two-dimensional Hilbert spaces, which we write as∣∣E′A B γκ κ˜ 〉 = ∣∣E′A B γκ 〉∣∣E′A B γκ˜ 〉. (47)
The individual states can be expanded as∣∣E′A B γ0 〉 = c0 |0〉 + c1 |1〉, (48)∣∣E′A B γ1 〉 = c0 |0〉 − c1 |1〉 (49)
and ∣∣E′A B γ+ 〉 = c+ |+〉 + c− |−〉, (50)∣∣E′A B γ− 〉 = c+ |+〉 − c− |−〉, (51)
where {|0〉, |1〉} and {|+〉, |−〉} are orthonormal basis
sets for the Hilbert spaces spanned by |E′A B γκ 〉 and |E′A B γκ˜ 〉,
respectively.
Our focus now turns to relating the coefficients to the
overlaps A and B. We perform the inner products〈
E
′A B γ
0 |E′A B γ0
〉 = |c0|2 + |c1|2 = 1, (52)〈
E
′A B γ
0 |E′A B γ1
〉 = |c0|2 − |c1|2 = A, (53)
from which we obtain expressions for the absolute values of
the coefficients c0 and c1 of
|c0|2 = 12 (1 + A), (54)
|c1|2 = 12 (1 − A), (55)
and following a similar calculation we arrive at the expres-
sions for the absolute values of the remaining coefficients
|c+|2 = 12 (1 + B), (56)
|c−|2 = 12 (1 − B). (57)
The values A and B are computed from the overlap formula
for Gaussian states [49], which, for two pure states ρˆ1 and ρˆ2
with the same CM V and different mean values x¯1 and x¯2,
reduces to
Tr(ρˆ1ρˆ2) = exp[− 14 (x¯1 − x¯2)TV−1(x¯1 − x¯2)] (58)
and our coefficients A and B become
A = 〈E′A B γ0 |E′A B γ1 〉 = exp
[
−1
2
A
2
(
1 − ητA
υ
)]
(59)
and
B = 〈E′A B γ+ |E′A B γ− 〉 = exp
[
−1
2
B
2
(
1 − ητB
υ
)]
. (60)
We now have all of the tools required to compute Eve’s
total state using Eq. (44). We arrive at the matrix
ˆE
′A B γ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
|c0|2|c+|2 |c0|2c+c∗−(+,−,+,−) |c+|2c0c∗1(+,+,−,−) c0c+c∗1c∗−(+,−,−,+)
|c0|2c−c∗+(+,−,+,−) |c0|2|c−|2 c0c−c∗1c∗+(+,−,−,+) |c−|2c0c∗1(+,+,−,−)
|c+|2c1c∗0(+,+,−,−) c1c+c∗0c∗−(+,−,−,+) |c1|2|c+|2 |c1|2c+c∗−(+,−,+,−)
c1c−c∗0c
∗
+(+,−,−,+) |c−|2c1c∗0(+,+,−,−) |c1|2c0c∗+(+,−,+,−) |c1|2|c−|2
⎞
⎟⎟⎠,
(61)
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where we have defined
(s1, s2, s3, s4) = s1 pA B γ0+ + s2 pA B γ0− + s3 pA B γ1+ + s4 pA B γ1− .
(62)
To obtain the entropy of the total state, we first compute the
eigenvalues of Eq. (61), which amounts to solving a quartic
equation in which the coefficients are combinations of the
absolute values of the basis coefficients. We then compute
their VNE using Eq. (36). This entropy is then substituted into
Eq. (37) to obtain the first term of the Holevo bound.
In order to compute the conditional state and the second
term of the Holevo bound, we construct the density matrices
of the conditional states. First, we have
ˆE
′A B γ
0 =
∣∣E′A B γ0 〉〈E′A B γ0 ∣∣⊗ (pA B γ+|0 |E′A B γ+ 〉〈E′A B γ+ ∣∣
+ pA B γ−|0
∣∣E′A B γ− 〉〈E′A B γ− ∣∣), (63)
which has corresponding eigenvalues
λ01,2 = 12
(
1 ±
√
1 − 16pA B γ+|0 pA B γ−|0 |c−|2|c+|2
)
. (64)
Then, for the counterpart state we have
ˆE
′A B γ
1 =
∣∣E′A B γ1 〉〈E′A B γ1 ∣∣⊗ (pA B γ+|1 ∣∣E′A B γ+ 〉〈E′A B γ+ ∣∣
+ pA B γ−|1
∣∣E′A B γ− 〉〈E′A B γ− ∣∣), (65)
with eigenvalues
λ11,2 = 12
(
1 ±
√
1 − 16pA B γ+|1 pA B γ−|1 |c−|2|c+|2
)
. (66)
Using the eigenvalues of the two states, it is straightforward to
compute the second term of the Holevo bound using Eq. (39).
A. Restricted eavesdropping
Let us now consider Eve’s accessible information in the
restricted eavesdropping scenario. In this case, Eve has to dis-
tinguish between two states corresponding to the two possible
values of κ . Under these conditions, it is possible to consider
both individual and collective attacks as we will outline in the
following sections.
1. Individual attacks
Let us first examine the case in which Eve employs indi-
vidual attacks and may not access a quantum memory. In this
case the mutual information between Alice and Eve IAE can be
estimated by from Eve’s error probability using the fidelity F
of Eve’s two possible states ρˆE′|+A γ and ρˆE′|−A γ , which we
compute using Eq. (58). We apply the lower bound
F− =
1 −√1 − F
2
(67)
in order to bound Eve’s error probability from below, mod-
eling a worst-case scenario for Alice and Bob [50]. The total
expression for the mutual information IAB becomes
IAE =
∫
p(A γ )[1 − H2(F−)]d A dγ , (68)
where H2(p) is the binary entropy.
2. Collective attacks
In the case of collective attacks we must compute the
Holevo bound in order to establish an upper bound on Eve’s
accessible information. The Holevo bound is given by
χRE(E′ : κ|A γ ) = S(E′|A γ ) − S(E′|κ A γ ), (69)
where the first term can be written as
S(E′|A γ ) =
∫
p(A γ )S(ρˆE′|A γ )d A d γ , (70)
where ρˆE′|A γ is the total state, given by
ρˆE′|A γ =
∑
κ
p(κ|A γ )ρˆE′|κ A γ . (71)
As it is derived from the sum of two Gaussian states, the total
state is non-Gaussian. To avoid the difficulty in obtaining the
entropy of this state from its photon statistics, we may employ
a non-Gaussian entropy approximation, which we derive in
Appendix B. Using the main result, we may write the CM of
the total state as
VE′|A = VE′|κ A + p(+|A γ )p(−|A γ )x¯E′ ·x¯TE′ , (72)
where x¯E′ = x¯E′|+A γ − x¯E′|−A γ . Taking the entropy of this
state via the symplectic eigenvalues {νi} of its CM provides
an upper bound on the exact entropy of Eve’s total state as it
assumes this state to be Gaussian. We therefore have
S(ρˆκ A γ ) < S(VE′|κ A γ ) =
∑
i
h(νi ), (73)
where
h(x) = x + 1
2
log2
x + 1
2
− x − 1
2
log2
x − 1
2
. (74)
Meanwhile, the second term of the Holevo bound involves
a Gaussian state and can be computed directly from the pro-
tocol output, independently of any measurement outcome. As
described in Sec. II, Eve’s CM VE′|κ A after the relay mea-
surements is obtained by tracing out Bob’s remaining mode.
The entropy is then simply computed from the symplectic
eigenvalues {υi} of the remaining CM by
S(ρˆE′|κ A) = S(VE′|κ A) =
∑
i
h(υi ). (75)
The Holevo bound is then reduced to the expression
χ (E′ : κ|A γ ) 
∫
p(A γ )S(VE′|A γ )d A d γ
− S(VE′|κ A γ ). (76)
V. APPLICATION OF POSTSELECTION
We have now computed all of the components required for
the calculation of the secret key rate and we can now describe
the postselection step that improves the range of our protocol.
Let us first write the mutual information as a single integrand
in the form
IAB =
∫
p(A B γ ) ˜IAB(A,B, γ )d A d B d γ , (77)
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where we defined the single-point mutual information
˜IAB(A,B, γ ) = Hκ|A B γ −
∑
κ˜ p(κ˜ |A B γ )Hκ| κ˜ A B γ . Simi-
larly, we can write the Holevo bound as a single integrand
χ =
∫
p(A B γ )χ˜ (A,B, γ )d A d B dγ , (78)
with χ˜ the single-point Holevo bound given by
χ˜ = S(ρˆE′|A B γ ) −
∑
κ
p(κ|A B γ )S(ρE′|κ A B γ ). (79)
In the same way, we define the single-point Holevo bound
for restricted eavesdropping χ˜RE for collective attacks and the
single-point mutual information between Alice and Eve ˜IAE
for individual attacks,
χRE  S(VE′|A γ ) − S(VE′|κ A γ ), (80)
˜IAE = 1 − H2(F−). (81)
Using these definitions, we may define the single-point rate
˜R = ˜IAB − χ˜ for complete eavesdropping, ˜R = ˜IAB − χ˜RE for
restricted eavesdropping, and ˜R = ˜IAB − ˜IAE for individual at-
tacks. We can then express the secret key rate in terms of the
single-point rate as
R =
∫
p(A B γ ) ˜R(A,B, γ )d A d B d γ . (82)
For postselection, we are interested in the region where the
single-point rate is positive so that the parties can choose to
only include instances of the protocol that contribute posi-
tively to the key rate. We can therefore define the postselected
key rate as
RPS =
∫
p(A B γ ) max{ ˜R(A,B, γ ), 0}d A d B d γ . (83)
We can also define the postselection area Ŵ, which is simply
the region of the A - B -γ volume in which the single-point
rate is positive. Computing the postselected rate amounts to
integrating the single-point rate in this volume,
RPS =
∫
Ŵ
p(A B γ ) ˜R(A,B, γ )d A d B d γ . (84)
VI. RESULTS
Let us now present numerical results for the rates of our
protocol under a variety of parameters. In order to express the
rates as a function of the distance between the parties, we first
use the relation τ = 10−dB/10 to express the transmissivity in
terms of the loss in decibels. Then, if the protocol is performed
with standard optical fiber, the length of the links can be
expressed in kilometers, assuming a loss per kilometer of 0.2
dB/km. We use the excess noise to express the variances ωA
and ωB in terms of the transmissivities of the channels. By
considering each link to be a point-to-point channel we write
ωA (B) = 1 + ǫA (B)
ητA (B)/2
1 − ητA (B)/2
, (85)
where ǫA (B) is the excess noise in the Alice-relay (Bob-relay)
links.
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FIG. 3. Rates of the pure-loss symmetric protocol as a function
of the total distance between Alice and Bob with σA, σB, and μ
optimized. The red line represents the rate of the symmetric Gaussian
MDI protocol.
Figure 3 shows the total distance between Alice and Bob
as a function of the rates of all variations of the protocol in the
symmetric configuration (τA = τB) and assuming a pure-loss
attack (ǫ = ǫA = ǫB = 0) with perfect detection efficiency.
The rates are optimized over the variances σA and σB (σA
and μ for restricted eavesdropping). For comparison we in-
clude the rate of the original Gaussian MDI protocol [32]
with equivalent parameters. At the cost of a lower rate at
short distances, our protocol improves the range at which the
parties may communicate. It is important to note that a fully
secure rate in which Bob broadcasts less information may lie
anywhere between the rates of the complete and restricted
eavesdropping cases, but despite being the worst-case sce-
nario, the rate under complete eavesdropping offers a notable
advantage over the Gaussian MDI protocol.
Figure 4 shows rates of protocol under complete eaves-
dropping as a function of the total distance between Alice
and Bob. We show the pure-loss rate with ideal parameters
η = 1 and β = 1 as well as a realistic rate with excess noise
ǫ = 0.05, detector efficiency of 98%, and reconciliation effi-
ciency of 95%. Again, we also show the optimal rates of the
Gaussian MDI protocol with identical parameters. Our pro-
tocol provides an advantage over the original MDI protocol
under ideal as well as realistic parameters. In Fig. 5 we explore
the asymmetric configuration of the protocol under complete
eavesdropping. We see that our protocol offers the biggest
advantage as the symmetry of the configuration increases.
However, we still observe an advantage in the asymmetric
regime up to very asymmetric configurations with less than
1 km separating Alice from the relay.
To explore the effect of the realistic parameters in more
detail, we consider in Fig. 6, for individual and collective
attacks with restricted eavesdropping, the rates with ǫ = 0.05,
η = 0.8, and β = 0.95 (these are typical choices [51]) in the
symmetric configuration. For each rate, we have incorporated
η by scaling the transmissivities on each link. This has a
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FIG. 4. Rates of the symmetric protocol function of the total dis-
tance between Alice and Bob with σA and σB optimized (black lines).
For comparison, we include the original Gaussian MDI protocol with
optimal parameters (red lines). The solid lines correspond to the
pure-loss protocols with ideal parameters η = 1 and β = 1, while
the dashed lines correspond to a realistic scenario in which ǫ = 0.05,
η = 0.98, and β = 0.95.
considerable effect on the rate but a distance exceeding 60 km
with collective attacks is still possible. In Appendix A we
consider the optimal parameters σA and μ for an experimental
configuration.
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FIG. 5. Comparison of the maximum Bob-relay distance as a
function of the Alice-relay distance under complete eavesdropping.
The black lines represent our protocol with the solid line correspond-
ing to the pure-loss case with ideal parameters η = 1 and β = 1 and
the dashed line corresponding to case with ǫ = 0.05 and imperfect
parameters η = 0.98 and β = 0.95. For comparison, the red line rep-
resents the pure-loss Gaussian MDI protocol with ideal parameters.
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FIG. 6. Rates of the symmetric protocol with restricted eaves-
dropping as a function of the total distance between Alice and Bob
with σA and μ optimized. The black lines correspond to the pure-loss
case with perfect detection and reconciliation, while the red lines
represent the rate with parameters ǫ = 0.05, η = 0.8, and β = 0.95.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have introduced a long-distance CV MDI
QKD protocol with a general mathematical formulation with
collective attacks which can include excess noise and experi-
mental inefficiencies. We have demonstrated that our protocol
surpasses the range of the original Gaussian CV MDI QKD
protocol in both symmetric and asymmetric configurations.
This improvement exists in the most powerful eavesdropping
scenario and is substantially increased to distances exceeding
50 km if restricted eavesdropping is considered with either
individual or collective attacks. In future work, it would be
beneficial to explore an achievable fully secure rate between
these extremes if Bob can communicate all of the necessary
information to Alice without broadcasting the absolute value
of his measurement in each use of the protocol.
Our protocol is robust against excess noise as well as
detection and reconciliation inefficiencies and it is therefore
a significant step towards a realistic experimental implemen-
tation. We have demonstrated that CV MDI QKD need not be
restricted to short distances. In fact, our protocol provides a
theoretical framework for MDI QKD at distances previously
achievable only with discrete variable protocols, obtainable
with inexpensive and easily implementable equipment.
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the protocol with restricted eavesdropping under individual attacks
(top panel) and collective attacks (bottom panel). The solid lines
represent the optimal parameters for the pure-loss case with ideal
detection and the dashed lines represent the optimal parameters for
ǫ = 0.05, η = 0.8, and β = 0.95.
APPENDIX A: OPTIMAL PARAMETERS
For the purposes of a proof-of-concept experiment, we
show in Fig. 7 the optimal parameters for the symmetric
protocol with restricted eavesdropping under individual (top)
and collective (bottom) attacks with the same parameters as
those used for the rates in Fig. 6 between 10 and 20 km. The
optimal values of μ are displayed with red lines, while black
lines correspond to optimal values of σA. We note that the
optimal parameters are small relative to the original Gaussian
MDI protocol in which the optimal value of μ tends to infinity
for perfect reconciliation efficiency.
APPENDIX B: ENTROPY APPROXIMATION OF A
NON-GAUSSIAN STATE
To avoid a complex treatment of non-Gaussian states in the
Fock basis, we introduce an approximation for the entropy
of a particular type of non-Gaussian state that is composed
of the average of two Gaussian states with the same CM and
different mean values. We use the CM and mean values of the
constituent states to write a formula for the CM of this state
and then, by calculating the entropy of this CM, we obtain an
estimate for its entropy. This approximation is most accurate
for states with small higher-order moments, but it is an upper
bound as it assumes the state to be Gaussian. This fact makes
the approximation particularly useful in quantum key distri-
bution when calculating the total entropy of an eavesdropper’s
non-Gaussian state in the Holevo bound.
We will label the constituent states of the state of interest
as ρˆ+ and ρˆ− with associated probabilities p(+) and p(−), re-
spectively. The general non-Gaussian state can then be written
as
ρˆ =
∑
κ=±
p(κ )ρˆκ . (B1)
Let us now recall the definitions of the mean value and CM
of a Gaussian state ρˆ. The mean value of an operator xˆi for a
state ρˆ is given by
x¯i = 〈xˆi〉 = Tr(xˆiρˆ ) (B2)
and the covariance matrix of a state is given by
Vi j = 12 〈{xˆi,xˆ j}〉 = 12 Tr[{xˆi, xˆ j}ρˆ] − x¯ix¯ j . (B3)
Using Eq. (B3), we can express the elements Vi j of the CM V
of a constituent state ρˆκ with mean value x¯κ as
V κi j + x¯κi x¯κj = 12 Tr[{xˆi, xˆ j}ρˆκ ] (B4)
and we can also write the elements V ′i j of the CM V′ of the
total state ρˆ as
V ′i j =
1
2
Tr
[
{xˆi, xˆ j}
(∑
κ=±
p(κ )ρˆκ
)]
− x¯ix¯ j
=
∑
κ=±
p(κ ) 12 Tr[{xˆi, xˆ j}ρˆκ ] − x¯ix¯ j . (B5)
We then substitute into this expression the right-hand side of
Eq. (B4) to obtain
V ′i j =
∑
κ=±
p(κ )(V κi j + x¯κi x¯κj )− x¯ix¯ j
= Vi j +
∑
κ=±
p(κ )x¯κi x¯κj − x¯ix¯ j, (B6)
where we have made use of the requirement that the CMs of
the constituent states are identical. Now, by writing the mean
values as x¯i = Tr(xˆiρˆ ) =
∑
κ p(κ ) Tr(xˆiρˆk ) and substituting
into Eq. (B6), we obtain
V ′i j = Vi j +
∑
κ=±
p(κ )x¯κi x¯κj −
∑
κ=±
∑
κ ′=±
p(κ )p(κ ′)x¯κi x¯κ
′
j (B7)
and by factoring out one of the sums we obtain
V ′i j = Vi j +
∑
κ=±
p(κ )
[
x¯κi x¯
κ
j −
∑
κ ′=±
p(κ ′)x¯κi x¯κ
′
j
]
= Vi j +
∑
κ=±
p(κ )[x¯κi x¯κj − p(κ )x¯κi x¯κj − p(−κ )x¯κi x¯−κj ]
= Vi j +
∑
κ=±
p(κ )p(−κ )x¯κi
(
x¯κj − x¯−κj
)
, (B8)
where we have used 1 − p(κ ) = p(−κ ). Note that
p(κ )p(−κ ) = p(+)p(−) for either value of κ , and∑
κ x¯
κ
i (x¯κj − x¯−κj ) = (x¯+j − x¯−j )
∑
κ κ x¯
κ
i . Therefore, we obtain
V ′i j = V+i j + p(+)p(−)(x¯+j − x¯−j )
∑
κ=±
κ x¯κi
= V+i j + p(+)p(−)(x¯+j − x¯−j )(x¯+i − x¯−i ). (B9)
We can write this in compact outer product form as
V′ = V + p(+)p(−)x¯ ·x¯T, (B10)
where x¯ = x¯+ − x¯−.
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